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INTRODUCTION: WHY FOCUS ON POWER IN PARTICIPATION?  
In Thailand as in other countries in Southeast Asia, the recent general policy-making 
framework regarding natural resource management is favoring decentralization and public 
participation. The reform of the Tambon (sub-district) Administrative Organization (TAO) in 
1994 and the adoption in 1997 of the so-called “People Constitution” embracing participation 
principles were two major turning points (Arghiros 2001; Rutherford 2002). The empowered 
TAO with their councils of elected villagers (two representatives per village) were held 
responsible to promote participatory decentralization on the ground, in particular in natural 
resource management (Puntasen 1997).  
As soon as the late eighties participation had become a buzz word in numerous projects 
and organizations in Northern Thailand (Neef 2004). However, there are several ways to 
understand the word participation, leading to different practices, and having different kinds of 
impacts. Hirsch (2002) broadly defines two main families of practicionners: those seeing 
participation as a mean, and those seeing it as a goal  While the first ones use participation to 
make local people and institutions accept more easily decisions taken at a higher level, the 
second ones aim at increasing local people and institutions’ voices in decision-making 
processes affecting them (Pretty 1995). However, because of high social heterogeneities 
among stakeholders, “maximum participation” of all stakeholders (and in particular the less 
privileged ones) is not always possible and does not necessarily lead to more social equity 
(Leeuwis and Van Den Ban 2004). Drawing lessons from numerous participatory water 
management projects conducted in the past, more and more authors argue that because of a 
lack of attention to the complex political contexts in which these projects were embedded, the 
less-powerful stakeholders were often left behind (Lavigne-Delville, Selamna et al. 2000; 
Cornwall and Gaventa 2001; Wollenberg, Anderson et al. 2001). Did a third family of 
practicionners of participatory approaches emerge? According to Faysse (2006), the 
importance of power in participation has drawn an important divide among scholars. Two 
main attitudes may be distinguished: a “dialogue” vision and a “critical” vision. According to 
the proponents of the dialogue vision, the main obstacles to fruitful coordination stem from a 
lack of genuine communication among stakeholders. Once this barrier is removed, it is 
possible to build a common vision, and to achieve consensus (Röling and Wagemakers 1998). 
In the nineties, the “critical learning system approach” emerged (Jackson 2000). Proponents 
of a “critical” vision argue that power relations need to be addressed prior to the participatory 
process, otherwise there is a high risk to see the process deepening existing social inequities 
(Jackson 2000; Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001). We adopt this vision and see participation as 
an interactive process of collective learning, negotiation and coordination among 
stakeholders. Participatory water management is then facing new challenges. Its political 
ecology has to be analyzed in its complexity, with its multiple stakeholders having differing 
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or competing interests, imbedded in a network of power relations, and interacting at various 
levels of governance.  
Ribot (2001) analyzed power relations and participation in a context of decentralization 
and public participation. This author questioned the representation and the accountability of 
the numerous local stakeholders who claim to speak for local people in participatory 
processes. In northern Thailand, those stakeholders are typically village headmen, TAO 
representatives, religious leaders, and usually belong to local elite. Because of the lack of 
communication between these people and their constituencies, and because they are 
themselves imbedded in a network of power relations, few are systematically downwardly 
accountable to their constituencies as a whole, and this represents a major threat to democratic 
decentralization.  
The participatory approach analyzed in this article is called Companion Modelling 
(ComMod) and its purpose is to stimulate collective learning and coordination among 
multiple stakeholders to mitigate a common natural resource management (NRM) problem 
through the collective building and use of simulation tools (Bousquet, Barreteau et al. 1999; 
Barreteau and al 2003).  
The importance of conducting an analysis of power relations prior to a ComMod process 
to tackle them along the conducted process is currently open to debate among ComMod 
practicionners. Drawing on a ComMod experiment about water management in a highland 
community of northern Thailand, this article aims at enriching this debate through an in-depth 
analysis of the impact of power relations on a ComMod process. The water management 
problem in this case study has its origins in the recent expansion of irrigated lychee and 
Oolong tea plantations in the village catchment. More and more social tensions occur within 
the community because only a minority of relatively well-off farmers have access to water to 
irrigate their plantations. The ComMod process aimed at stimulating collective learning and 
negotiation about this problem among villagers, and between villagers and the TAO (sub-
district administration) having financial resources to fund local projects such as the 
construction of small-scale water infrastructures.  
This contribution starts with a presentation of the ComMod methodology and the 
conceptual analytical framework of the socio-political system and its changes along the 
process. Then we draw a picture of the initial situation regarding water management, with a 
particular attention to horizontal and vertical power relations and to the role, behaviour, and 
accountability of local representatives. Following a description of the collective learning and 
negociation process triggered by ComMod, we analyze the influence of power relations in the 
process and their changes along it to answer the question: how far the diversity of interests 
(and in particular the less powerfull’s ones) was taken into account in the triggered process of 
interactions? The article ends with a discussion on the potential and limits of the ComMod 
methodology for accommodating multiple interests in an equitable manner. Key 
methodological features favouring the leveling of the playing field are identified. In the 
concluding remarks, several suggestions are made to improve the ComMod methodology for 
such a purpose. We argue that it is necessary to conduct a preliminary analysis of the socio-
political system to identify the potential constraints and pitfalls to an equitable outcome of the 
participatory management process, and to mitigate them. Following Webler’s advice (1999), 
we do not only focus on “what works”, but also analyse “why it works” and “how it could 
work better”.  
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK & METHOD 
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Conceptual analytical framework  
This section presents the conceptual framework used to analyze the initial ecological, social 
and political system and its changes along the ComMod process in terms of collective 
learning and negotiation among the various stakeholders. As the objective of this contribution 
is to analyze the importance of power relations in a ComMod process, power relations are at 
the core of the analysis of both the initial situation and the effects of the process.      
Analysis of the initial ecological, social, and political system  
To elaborate our conceptual analytical framework of the local agro-socio-ecosystem, we 
relied on several theoretical inputs as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Agrarian system theory
Interacting ecological & social dynamics
Farming households strategies
Institutional analysis
Horizontal & vertical interactions 
Power relations
Accountability of representatives
Learning theory
Stakeholders’ perception of : - problem
- other stakeholders
- possible solutions
Expressions of power
& changes in power relations
along the interactive process  
Changes in perceptions 
along the collective learning 
and negociation process 
Initial 
ecological & social 
system
 
Figure 1. Conceptual analytical framework. 
 
We used the agrarian system theory (Mazoyer and Roudart 1997) to examine the 
interactions between the socio-economic and agro-ecological dynamics of the local system, 
and to determine differences in farming households constraints, aspirations, and strategies 
(Trébuil and Dufumier 1993). We also used an institutional analysis to further elaborate on 
the political ecology of water management at this research site. Institutions are here defined as 
a set of formal and informal rules that regulate the interactions among people, i.e. the rules of 
the game of a socio-political setting (Ostrom, Gardner et al. 1994). In the context of 
decentralization, these interactions were analyzed according to two dimensions and in term of 
power relations along them:  
- horizontal interactions among people within the community, and  
- vertical interactions between villagers and higher level institutions such as TAO.  
At the intersection of these axes lays the key role of village leaders and representatives, in 
particular village headmen and elected members of the TAO council.  
The way power relations are characterized is crucial because it influences the way they 
are tackled. Classical dichotomies seeing the powerful on one side, and the powerless on the 
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other side are problematic because they do not take into account “the power of the 
powerless”, and therefore deny their possibility of empowerment as to empower means to 
reinforce an existing power (Vermeulen 2005). Weber (1968) broadly defined power as the 
chance that an individual in a social relationship can achieve his or her own will even against 
the resistance of others. According to the structural properties of social systems as defined by 
Giddens (1984), ressources to exert power can be categorized into three main types: (a) 
knowledge, (b) cultural norms and values attributing authority and responsibility to certain 
roles, and (c) physical resources such as money, natural resources, human resources and 
networks (Van Paassen 2004). This characterization of power is useful as it embraces several 
aspects of a social system. Weber (1968) analyzed more precisely the second source of power. 
He defined authority as legitimate forms of domination and identified three main types of 
authority: legal, charismatic, and traditionnal. Boulding (1989) characterizes power relations 
according to their mechanism: stick, carrot, or hug. The stick and carrot are familiar 
metaphors, stick standing for force, and carrot for enticement. Both are coercive forms of 
power. The most interesting concept in Boulding’s characterization of power is the hug 
because it provides a variable to look at the empowerment of the disadvantaged. Hug is a way 
to describe integrative or cooperative forms of power, i.e. the power of people joining 
together and obeying to the same principles because they have the feeling they belong to the 
same group. In Giddens’ classification of power ressources, this type of hug or cooperative 
power uses human ressources and networks. Counter power (the power to oppose to the 
oppressors) can be seen as a form of cooperative power of the less powerful stakeholders.   
Because our ultimate purpose was to examine how the ComMod process would produce 
changes in the system in terms of communication and coordination, we also used the 
collective learning and negotiation theory which focuses on changing perceptions and 
interactions (Leeuwis and Van Den Ban 2004). Following the identification of the main 
concerned stakeholders, we analyzed:  
- their perception of the water issue (interest in, knowledge about and collective vision 
of this issue),  
- their perception of other stakeholders and their interactions with them,  
- their perception of possible scenarios to mitigate the problem.  
The stakeholders’ perceptions and interactions were analyzed before the third ComMod cycle 
about water management (analysis of the initial situation), and we followed their evolution all 
along this cycle. Next section provides more details on the conceptual framework used to  
analyze the effects of this third ComMod cycle.     
Analysis of the effects of the Companion Modelling process    
The effects of the ComMod process were analyzed in terms of collective learning and 
negotiation processes. Leeuwis (2004) distinguishes between distributive and integrative 
negotiation. Distributive negotiation occurs when stakeholders tend to hold on their own 
positions, try to impose their vision at the detriment of other people’s interest, and finally use 
the negotiation to “divide the cake”. ComMod tries to trigger more integrative learning and 
negociation processes because they give more positive outcomes. In integrative negotiation 
processes stakeholders reframe the problem and create new problem definitions allowing to 
“enlarge the cake” and to identify “win-win” solutions. Such integrative negotiation is based 
on a creative collective learning process made of several tasks: learning about the current 
situation, increased awareness of a problem to be solved collectively, learning about other 
stakeholders’ perceptions, collective (re)phrasing of the nature of the problem, coordination of 
interests through identification and negotiation of new scenarios to solve the re-phrased 
problem (Leeuwis 2004).  
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To pay a special attention to expressions of power relations and to their changes along the 
negotiation process, we used various theoretical and practical inputs about power and 
empowerment in multi-stakeholder processes. Among all the possible expressions of power in 
a participatory process, Faysse (2006) highlights the following three ones:  
- the power to impose one’s ideas during the discussion and control the decisions taken 
by dominating the discussion, and/or ignoring other peole’s opinions (using 
knowledge and communication skills as sources of power);  
- the power to control the implementation of these decisions and not to follow the 
agreement made during the discussion (using autority as a source of power); and  
- the power to stay away from the negotiation process. This will happen if such 
stakeholders have a good BATNA, i.e. a Best Alternative To No Agreement (Fisher 
and Ury 1981). They use physical ressources as a source of power. It means that they 
might not negotiate with the less powerful stakeholders unless they have no better 
option.  
In some settings powerful stakeholders only engage in negotiations once the other 
parties have created alliances and increased their cooperative power base (Ramirez 2001), or 
only when they are forced to do so by an even more powerful agent operating at a higher level 
in the system hierarchy. If and when they decide that they have no better option, the less 
powerful need to have the capacity to defend their interests. They should be free to express 
themselves, have access to information, and be able to understand the issue at stake. To do so, 
some might need to be empowered. These dynamics of empowerment are crucial when trying 
to achieve democratic participation. Rowlands (1995) identified three dimensions of 
empowerment:  
- personal empowerment: the development of selfconfidence and personal capacities, 
- relational empowerment: the development of skills for negotiation and influencing the 
basics of a relationship and the decisions made within it, and  
- collective empowerment: learning to work together to achieve more. 
A Companion Modelling process paying attention to power relations 
Co-construction of simulation tools such as Role-Playing Games and Multi-Agents Systems 
The main objective of the ComMod approach conducted in this case study was to trigger 
collective learning and negotiation among stakeholders having a common water management 
problem. The main methodological principle of ComMod is to co-construct simulation 
models integrating different stakeholders’ points of view, and to use them to collectively 
explore and discuss various scenarios for the future. The practical implementation of 
ComMod combines the use of different tools such as individual interviews, group debates, 
Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) and Role-Playing Games (RPG).    
MAS are appropriate simulation tools to examine complex renewable resource 
management problems because they focus on interactions among heterogeneous social agents 
and their common environment. RPGs are appropriate to represent complex systems and their 
interactive dynamics, and to stimulate exchanges of perspectives among stakeholders. In this 
experiment, the RPG (played by villagers) is a simplified version of the MAS model, the RPG 
and its associated MAS model are two versions and implementations of the same conceptual 
model. The RPG  helps participants to understand and criticize the model.  
ComMod is a continual and iterative process implemented in a cyclic way. Figure 2 
illustrates the three successive ComMod cycles implemented at this study site.  
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Figure 2. The three successive Companion Modelling cycles implemented in Mae Salaep 
village of Chiang Rai Province, northern Thailand, between 2002 and 2005. 
 
The learning process stimulated in a cycle raised new questions that were examined in the 
following cycle with new adapted RPG and associated MAS model. In the first cycle focusing 
on the soil erosion problem, the participants identified the expansion of perennial crops as a 
promising solution, and requested to focus the second cycle on the socio-economic constraints 
limiting their ability to invest in plantation crops (Trébuil, Bousquet et al. 2002; Barnaud, 
Promburom et al. 2005). Later on, as these perennial crops requested irrigation to improve 
yield and product quality, more social tension occurred among villagers because of a growing 
gap between water availability and increasing needs. The participants requested to examine 
this water problem in a third ComMod cycle, which is presented and analyzed in this article. 
Its implementation is described in box 1. For this third ComMod cycle on water management, 
the participants also requested the participation of the TAO because this organization has 
financial resources to fund local projects such as the construction of small-scale water 
infrastructures. That was an opportunity for the researchers to analyze interactions between 
communities and higher level institutions.  
 6
 
Box 1. Main steps of the third ComMod cycle about irrigation water implemented in 
Mae Salaep village of Chiang Rai Province, northern Thailand, in 2005. 
- Institutional analysis of the water problem: semi-structured interviews with villagers, village headman, 
TAO village representatives, TAO officers, and the President of the TAO council.  
- Modification of the previous RPG and MAS model to focus the activities on the water problem. 
- Participatory workshop (Day 1): Gaming sessions (12 villagers-players) 
Morning: 1st gaming session (current situation scenario). 
Debriefing in plenary session: problem definition & suggestion of solutions by the participants. 
Presentation of these propositions to the TAO council President.  
Afternoon: 2nd gaming session to test one of the proposed solutions.  
- Participatory workshop (Day 2): Individual interviews of players 
To compare researchers’ and players’ understandings & representations of the situation,  
To better understand players’ behaviour during the gaming sessions,   
To learn about their individual opinions regarding the discussed issues, 
To assess the learning effects of the RPG. 
- Participatory workshop (Day 3): Participatory simulations & collective discussion of scenarios  
(i) Baseline scenario corresponding to the current situation,  
(ii) Simulation of scenarios testing the participants’ propositions.  
- Continuous monitoring & evaluation of the process: 
3 weeks later: individual interviews with all the participants to assess the effects of the workshop 
& participatory simulations within smalll homogenous groups to accompany the on-going 
discussions.  
3 months later: previous activity was repeated. 
10 months later: “story telling” interviews with key participants to follow-up on the evolution of 
exchanges among villagers.         
Methods to analyze the initial situation and the effects of the ComMod process 
We previoulsy described the conceptual analytical framework used to analyse the initial 
situation, the effects of the ComMod process, and the influence and evolution of power 
relations along the process of triggered exchanges among villagers. From a methodological 
point of view, the data analyzed according to this conceptual framework were obtained 
through individual interviews conducted before and after the ComMod workshop, and 
observations made during the workshop (Box 2):  
- semi-structured individual interviews before the workshop to understand the initial 
situation,  
- observations of the players’ behaviour during the gaming sessions and group debates,  
- semi-structured interviews conducted the day after the game,  
- new semi-structured interviews conducted three weeks & three months after the 
workshop for a continuous assessment of the effects (changes in perceptions, 
behaviour, communication and interactions, and practices).     
INITIAL SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT   
Agrarian situation and water management problem 
Mae Salaep is an Akha village located in a highland catchment of Chiang Rai Province in 
upper northern Thailand. Small-scale poor farmers are being rapidly integrated into the 
market economy and over the last two decades their former agrarian system based on 
swiddening was replaced by mainly permanent cash-crop based agriculture on steep slopes 
(Trébuil, Kam et al. 1997). One of the innovations adopted by villagers during this period is 
the plantation of perennial crops such as lychee and, more recently, green tea. As the lychee 
yields and quality are much higher under irrigation in the dry season, farmers who could 
afford the investment started to use gravity irrigation in the early nineties. The irrigation 
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system consists of a network of small PVC pipes connected to the creeks. Each creek is 
usually providing enough water to one to three farmers, depending on the rainfall and the 
plantation size. A few farmers also have small ponds to store water. Contrary to lychee, 
Assam tea doesn’t require irrigation nor external inputs. Its commercial value is less 
important but more stable than lychee’s one6. Villagers call it the “perennial crop of the poor”, 
but many poor households still cannot afford it because of a lack of access to adapted credit 
(Barnaud, Promburom et al. 2005). In recent years, government agencies introduced the high 
added-value variety of Oolong tea which production requires high levels of input and 
irrigation. As Oolong tea and lychee are expanding in the catchment, there is an increasing 
problem of water scarcity in the dry season. More conflicts occur in the community because 
only a minority of relatively well-off farmers and first settlers have access to irrigation water. 
This is due to the “first arrived first served” rule which stipulates that once a farmer has set up 
water pipes in a creek, other villagers cannot get water from the upstream section.  
The Tambon Administrative Organization (TAO) and its representatives 
TAOs are considered as key administrative institutions towards democratic decentralization in 
rural Thailand (Puntasen 1997). Decisions regarding the allocation of TAO resources are 
taken by a council of elected members (two elected representatives per village), and a 
presidential team made of a president and two vice-presidents elected by the tambon 
population. However, there are still obstacles on the way to reach the desired aim. According 
to Arghiros (2001), local participatory patterns cannot develop because Thailand’s highly 
centralized bureaucracy still promotes its own hierarchical and “top-down” institutional 
culture. Moreover, most of the TAO representatives come from the local economic elite, and 
the democratic mechanisms of responsiveness and accountability cannot function because 
elections are commonly distorted by vote-buying.  
In this case study, the interviewed TAO President had perfectly absorbed the 
participatory discourse: “We want to support villagers’ own initiatives. They should conceive 
the projects themselves. If the President does it for them, it cannot work.” However, as we 
will see later in this article, there is a sharp contrast between this discourse and the actual 
practices of this TAO President as it is often the case in participatory projects (Pijnenburg 
2004). The two TAO village representatives from Mae Salaep belong to the relatively well-off 
type of farmers from the early settling clans, which are also the largest ones, a factor 
explaining also why they could more easily win elections. Following the administrative 
reform and the increase in financial resources allocated to the TAOs, there was a shift of 
interest of the local elite from the village headmen positions to TAOs village representatives. 
As no one really wants to be village headman, this position is often occupied by farmers who 
don’t feel very much concerned by the well-being of their community. As for the TAO 
members, they show more interest in local politics but their downwards accountability to the 
community as a whole is clearly put into question as they are commonly accused by people 
from other clans to take advantage of their position to serve their own clan’s interests in the 
implementation of village projects. Moreover, they feel much more upwards accountable than 
downwards accountable. In Mae Salaep, if the TAO President has well adopted the 
participatory discourse, the two TAO village representatives define their role as being top-
down relays between the sub-district administrators and the villagers, without mentioning 
their involvement in any bottom-up mechanisms. Both of them said that their “role is to 
inform villagers about the government’ decisions”, and this reflects how decentralization is 
practised on the ground.  
                                                 
6 Lychee and Assam tea prices fluctuate from around 3 to 70 Bahts/kg and 6 to 12 Bahts/kg respectively. 
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In terms of power relations, the TAO President and the representatives use their legal 
autority and their access to ressources (information, TAO budget, etc.) to exert power. In 
Boulding’s terms, they exert mainly a “carrot” type of power because they can influence the 
way projects will be implemented, and therefore who will benefit from them.  
According to a study conducted by Heyd and Neef (2004) in another area of northern 
Thailand, villagers did not feel any change in term of their ability to participate in decision-
making since the TAO reform. In Mae Salaep, although some villagers complained about the 
inadequation between their needs and the TAO projects, almost none of them is aware of the 
active role they could (and should) play in the elaboration of these projects. 
Main stakeholders’ perceptions and interactions  
Main types of farming households  
Farming households’ integration into the market economy has led to an extensive 
socioeconomic differentiation among them which can be characterized by different amounts 
of available productive resources, and related specific socio-economic and land-use strategies 
(Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Characterictics of the main types of farming households in Mae Salaep of 
Chiang Rai Province, upper northern Thailand. 
 
Farm type A. Vulnerable landless 
or very smallholders 
B. Self-sufficient & 
medium-sized farms  
C. Relatively large & 
diversified farms 
Size (ha/labour (1)) 0,4 – 0,8 0,8 – 2,4 1,3 – 3,2 
Main crops  Maize (for cash). Upland rice (for family 
consumption), maize, 
small and rainfed 
plantations of Assam 
tea or lychee.  
Paddy rice (for family 
consumption), maize, 
extensive irrigated 
plantations of lychee, 
Oolong and/or Assam 
tea. 
Off-farm employment To meet basic family 
needs. 
To mitigate fluctuations 
of farming incomes. 
To raise cash & invest 
on the farm. 
Total annual household 
cash income (US 
Dollars/year) (2) 
200 420 1160 
Investment capacity Nil Weak Significant  
(1) l labour unit is equivalent to 300 working days per year. 
(2) The local household surviving threshold (to meet the household basic needs) is  210 USdollars / household/ 
year, while the annual income from minimum wages paid to city workers is 750 US dollars/year.  
 
Type C farmers are well-off farmers belonging to influential clans of first settlers with 
access to water and the most productive farm land. They were able to claim large farming 
areas, accumulate capital, and invest in profitable off-farm activities allowing them to invest 
in large lychee plantations. This confers a high social and economic status to them in the 
village. The old men of these clans are members of the traditional council of elders which has 
less influence than in the past, but is still respected and retain some traditional autority. 
Moreover, as they were the first settlers, their farm land is located in the lowlands of the 
watershed, with less steep slopes and a better access to water allowing them to grow more 
paddy rice than others. When they started to irrigate their orchards some 15 years ago, they 
claimed that the “first arrived first served rule” was an ancestral custom to regulate access to 
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water. They reinforced this rule (and the claim of its ancestral nature) when the number of 
villagers looking for access to water started to increase. Two main attitudes are observed 
among them: those who strictly apply the rule, without any arrangements, and those who 
agree to set up arrangements such as exchanges of water against money, labour, or for free. 
The adoption of one attitude or another depends on the age of the farmer (young ones are 
often more individualistic as they have a new family to feed), on the amount of water 
available, and on the relationship among farmers (more arrangements are observed among 
people belonging to the same clan).   
The heads of type A and B farming households are either widows, or men who immigrated 
more recently, and belong to smaller and less influential clans. They do not have access to 
water. Some of them have invested in low yielding rainfed lychee plantations. However, most 
of them do not dare to put the “first arrived first served rule” into question. Two social power 
related mechanisms explain this fact. First, they have a strong sense of belonging to the 
community, and do not want to break a rule considered as an ancestral community one. 
Moreover, they are usually in a relation of dependence (or patronage) with the powerful type 
C clans from whom they borrow money when needed or work as daily hired labourers on 
their farms (these wages being often their main source of cash income), etc. In terms of power 
relations, Type C farmers use both traditionnal autority and physical ressources to exert a 
“carrot” type of power over type A and B farmers.  
Village leaders and representatives   
Two opposing leaders played a key role in the ComMod cycle about water. The first one is a 
TAO representative. He has the reputation in the village to draw and implement the TAO 
projects to serve his own or his clan’s interests. He recently concluded a deal with an external 
investor who bought 6,25 ha of land in the village with the idea to plant it to Oolong tea in the 
future, the TAO representative taking care of the plantation and sharing the product with the 
investor. As such a plantation would require a lot of irrigation water, this TAO representative 
had a strong personal interest to defend in the ComMod cycle about water.  
The second stakeholder who played a key role in the ComMod process is the religious 
leader of the Christian community which represents 60 % of the village population. He is a 
well-off farmer, but he does not belong to any of the powerful clans. He is a respected person 
in the village, as a religious leader and as a leading innovator. As a knowledgeable person, he 
holds a charismatic autority, and creates a “hug” kind of power within the Christian 
community, as well as among all the poor villagers because he actively promotes equity by 
supporting households facing difficulties (by providing technical advice, through free 
distribution of tea seedlings, etc.). Contrary to the TAO representative, he doesn’t speak Thai, 
and does not express himself easily during plenary debates. However, he was the first one 
who raised the idea to use the game to discuss the water problem and who requested to invite 
the TAO.  
The village headman was interviewed and warmly invited to take part the ComMod 
process. He was not available at that time, but he sent a member of the village committee to 
replace him, and his father, a type C farmer belonging to the council of elders, participated. 
However, his absence reflects a general lack of commitment for the village’s well-being, 
which is a frequent phenomenon in rural Thailand since the TAO reform in 1994.  
  In summary, Figure 3 represents the power relations among the participants in the 
ComMod process, including the potential counter-power of the less powerful.      
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TAO 
President 
Legal authority &  
Access to ressources, 
Carrot power
TAO village 
representative 
Legal authority &  Christian 
leaderAccess to ressources, Carrot power
Charismatic authority 
& Knowledge, 
Hug power 
Counter power Well-off farmers 
(type C) 
Hug power 
Poor farmers 
(type A & B)Traditional  authority  & Access to ressources, 
Carrot power 
 
 
Figure 3. Initial power relations among the participants in the ComMod process 
implemented in Mae Salaep village of Chiang Rai Province, northern Thailand, in 2005. 
 
POWER DYNAMICS IN THE LEARNING AND NEGOTIATIONG PROCESS 
What happened during the ComMod process?  
Box 2 provides a description of the chain of events that occurred along the third ComMod 
cycle.   
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 1. The first gaming session highlighted the problem of unequal access to water. Three well-off farmers 
(including the TAO representative) urged to plug their pipes into the two creeks of the gaming board, and 
prevented other players from putting new pipes in the upstream sections. Therefore only three out of twelve 
players had access to irrigation water.   
 
2. This first gaming session was followed by a short debriefing for players to exchange their views on the 
water problem and to identify possible solutions. Among players with no access to water, some said the 
problem was the lack of money to buy pipes, while others said the problem was the geographical location of 
their plots (above the streams). Players with access to water said the problem was the lack of water. The 
TAO representative then summarized the situation by saying that there were two problems: the lack of 
water, and the plots located above the streams. 
 
3. The TAO representative suggested to build a large reservoir above the village, a project which he already 
presented to the Irrigation Department, and was rejected. The other participants looked skeptical about this 
suggestion as it would benefit only a minority of farmers, but none of them openly expressed any 
disagreement. When the facilitator asked for other suggestions, the Christian leader suggested to build small 
weirs on several creeks and to share the water within small user groups of three to four households. The 
facilitator made the participants vote by a show of hands: all (including the TAO representative) participants 
agreed on this second suggestion, except a participant whose plots were located above the streams. There 
were further discussions among the paticipants and they decided to test this scenario and associated water 
allocation rules in the game. 
 
4. When the participants presented their suggestion to the TAO President, she did not really answer to the 
suggestion and explained that villagers should remember that they have no land titles and be aware that 
they might be relocated from the highlands one day, so they should wait for water management plan at the 
national level before taking any decision. After her intervention, the players decided to test their preferred 
scenario anyway during the afternoon gaming session.  
 
5. Two small weirs were added across the two creeks of the gaming board. All the players who had lychee 
plantations and had no access to water in the previous gaming session progressively decided to invest in 
pipes to connect their plots to the weir. This stimulated new discussions among players about the rules for 
the allocation of water among the groups of beneficiaries. They could further investigate this issue during the 
participatory simulations on the third day of the workshop. The TAO representative dominated the 
discussions and suggested that if such infrastructures were built, water should be allocated proportionaly to 
the size of farmers’ plantations, i.e. a water sharing rule favouring the well-off farmers. No one contested this 
suggestion at first.  
 
6. But three weeks later, when new sessions of participatory simulations among smaller and homogeneous 
groups were conducted, villagers had continued to discuss among them and agreed on another way to 
share the water if the small weirs were built. They suggested to allocate the same amount of water to each 
beneficiary of the weir, with the possibility to lend temporary water rights to other members in case of 
excess. The TAO representative tried again to make his point (saying that “poor villagers are not ready for 
irrigation”) and never really agreed with the majority.  
 
7. Three months later, the TAO representative was about to present a project to the TAO council which 
looked much more like his initial suggestion (a single reservoir above the village) than the agreed upon 
collective option negotiated during the ComMod exchange, that is several small weirs on several creeks.  
 
8. Ten months later the TAO representative and the Chistian leader had finally collaborated to design a new 
project merging ideas from both, and still favouring the powerless people who don’t have access to water.  
ox 2. Chain of events during the ComMod process related to water issue implemented 
n Mae Salaep village of Chiang Rai Province, northern Thailand, in 2005. 
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Analysis of power dynamics in learning and negotiation process 
Increased awareness of a collective problem: a first step towards changing power relations? 
During interviews before the gaming sessions, well-off farmers having access to water always 
said that “there is no water problem in the village, no conflict, everything is all right.” They 
have obviously a good BATNA and more interest in a statu quo situation than being part of a 
process to solve the problem of those who don’t have access to water. Even among people 
who don’t have access to water, many will not dare to say that actually there is a problem. 
This is very linked to the cultural context: Akha people, like Thai people, usually do not like 
to say that “there is a problem” because they prefer to avoid confrontation. 
However, in the gaming session, as they played exactly like they behave in reality, they 
implemented the first arrived first served rule, and the problem of unequal access to water 
became obvious to all (Box 2, step 1). They said that it happened exactly like in reality and 
the Christian leader thinks that: “the game showed them that we need to change the water 
access rules, no need to speak about it”. This “no need to speak” dimension probably played 
an important facilitating role in a cultural context dominated by the avoidance of direct 
confrontation.  
Phrasing the nature of the problem and the direct expression of interests and power 
relations 
The phrasing of the problem is a crucial step in a negotiation process as it will influence the 
way people look for solutions. In this case, when asked about the problem they encountered in 
the first gaming session, the players with no access to water could have said the problem was 
the “first arrived first served rule”. But none of them dared to say that in the plenary 
discussions. So, instead, they just said the problem was the lack of money to buy the pipes, or 
the topographic position of their fields (Box 2, step 2).  
The TAO representative used his autority and his communication skills to impose his 
ideas during this phase and to emphasize the lack of water aspect, which implied the need for 
new water storage infratructure.  
The Christian leader did not say anything at this point. He knew it was impossible to 
question directly the “first arrived first served” rule because well-off clans would not accept 
it. As he and other participants said later: « it will be possible to change the “first arrived first 
served” rule only if we build new water infrastructures that will lead us to discuss new water 
allocation rules. Without new infratructures, it is impossible to change the rules.” Therefore, 
at this precise stage, it was also in his interest to let the TAO representative say that the lack 
of water was at the centre of the problem.  
This phrasing of the problem might also be explained by the fact that people generally 
prefer talking about issues rather than about persons. It is even commonly advised in 
negotiation processes, not to raise emotions unnecessarily. 
Coordination of interests and negotiation of solutions: empowerment of the less powerful is 
needed 
In a collective learning process, in spite of previous phases of improved communication and 
exchanges of perceptions among participants, the phase during which the participants 
synthesize the diverse expressed facts and arguments to formulate a preferred pathway to a 
solution is determining. It is at this stage that the most influential participants risk to impose 
(consciously or not) their point of view (Van der Veen 2000). Indeed, in this case study, at 
this stage the most powerful stakeholders used various forms of power to influence the course 
of the process:  
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- the power to impose one’s ideas during the discussion, when the TAO representative 
imposed his way to share the water during the first session of participatory simulations 
(Box 2, step 5), 
- the power to control the implementation of these decisions, when this representative 
was about to present a project to the TAO which did not follow the agreement made 
during the discussion (Box 2, step 7), 
- the power not to join the discussion, when the TAO President did not answer the 
villagers’proposition and simply spoke about something else (Box 2, step 4).  
 
However, along this process, the interests of the less powerful stakeholders were 
progressively taken into account:  
- when during the gaming sessions, the researchers asked the participants to vote for one 
of the two sugggesed solutions, the majority of the participants voted for the small 
weirs option made by the Christian leader (Box 2, step 3),  
- when the researchers came back three weeks after the workshop, they could see that 
after further discussions among villagers behind the scene, the majority agreed on 
more egalitarian rules for water allocation (Box 2, step 6), and 
- when the researchers came back ten months later, after discussions at the village level, 
the project that was finally presented took more clearly into account the interests of 
the less powerfull stakeholders than the one initially suggested by the TAO 
representative (Box 2, step 8).  
 
This was achieved through a process of empowerment characterized by several 
dimensions: 
- personal empowerment: the development of selfconfidence is particularly important in 
the context of northern Thailand where the numerous prejudices against ethnic minorities are 
so strong that villagers themselves feel that they are not able to have any good ideas and to 
express them: “I never went out of the village, I never learned anything, I cannot have ideas” 
said an old man. The ComMod process improved the participants selfconfidence: “I did not 
know that I would be able to play the game, to think by myself about solutions” said a female 
participant. The ComMod process also supported the development of their personal capacities 
by allowing them to better understand the situation, and stimulating their ability to imagine 
new solutions. “The game allows us to distance ourselves from our problems, and to discuss 
together about them” said a participant. “Without the game, we would go on in our every day 
life” declared another one.  
- relational empowerment: except from creating the event and therefore giving to the 
participants the opportunity to communicate, the ComMod process did not directly triggered 
an increase in the participants’ communication and negotiation skills, but it did indirectly as 
relational empowerment is very linked to personal and collective empowerment (general 
increased self-confidence to defend one’ interests in negotiation).  
- collective empowerment: this is one of the stronger effect of the ComMod process 
which came out from the evaluation interviews. Most of the participants insisted on the idea 
that the game made them realize that they were collectively “stronger” or “more intelligent” 
than individually and could find better solutions. “In real life, we do not have such 
opportunities to think collectively. Everyone goes in the field, and is alone to solve his 
problem” said several participants. In this ComMod experiment, this collective empowerment 
goes further than just “thinking collectively”. There was a process of empowerment through 
the creation of alliances allowing the reinforcement of a counter power as the less powerful 
stakeholders realized that they could join together to make their voice louder. “I realized that 
many of us face the same problem” said a participant. The Christian leader played a key role 
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in the construction of this alliance. As a woman said: “if I think alone, I do not have good 
ideas. But if we think all together, we can all benefit from the good ideas of people like the 
Christian leader”. This counter power was also born from their increased self-confidence 
making them more aware that it was possible to question long standing rules. A better 
understanding of the situation probably also made them realize that they had a weak BATNA 
and that if they did not do anything, they would never have access to water. Most of this 
counter power was built between the formal activities implemented along the ComMod 
process, behind the scenes when villagers discussed among family members, with  
neighbours, and with the Christian leader.  
It is probably because this counter power had became better organized and stronger that 
the TAO representative finally decided to collaborate with the Christian leader to establish a 
new project taking into account the interests of type A and B farmers (Box 2, step 8). A 
turning point might have been when some of the elders of the powerful clans themselves 
turned to be in favour of a new discussion of the rules, realizing that there would be more and 
more conflicts about water in the future if the statu quo was defended.  
POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF THIS COMMOD PROCESS TO LEVEL THE PLAYING 
FIELD 
Key methodological features favouring the accommodation of multiple interests 
Selection of the participants 
Contrary to some other academics, Edmunds and Wollenberg (2001) argue that not all 
stakeholders should systematically participate in a multi-stakeholder process. If not yet  
empowered prior to such exercise, the less powerful ones might not be able to defend their 
interests properly. This is why we implemented the ComMod process at the village level first, 
and integrated stakeholders from higher institutional levels only when the villagers felt at ease 
to do so and requested their participation themselves. When selecting the participants, we also 
tried to avoid the representation of a category of interest by a single, shy or intimated person. 
For example, several women could have been very intimidated when participating alone but 
more self-confident when sitting next to acquaintances. But to keep the process manageable, 
the number of participants in the main activities (especially RPG sessions) is rather limited. 
And ensuring that what happens during these key moments is disseminated to other villagers 
is important. 
 By providing them with an opportunity to meet and exchange their ideas, the selection 
of the participants also influence the kinds of alliances that could emerge during the process. 
The identification and the presence of a key stakeholder such as the Christian leader, who was 
particularly bottom-up minded and had sufficient charismatic authority to stimulate people to 
join together, was crucial to reinforce the voice of the powerless.  
The  co-construction of tools  within the reach of everyone 
One of the challenges in the implementation of the ComMod approach is to make models 
representing complex situations that all participants can understand. To reach this goal, they 
should all genuinely participate in their construction. In this experiment, the Role-Playing 
Game (RPG) which was built was very similar to its computerized MAS model so that the 
participants could understand what the simulator is doing when running a given scenario. This 
procedure also gives them the opportunity to criticize the model and to suggest improvements. 
For example, the participants requested themselves to modify the model to make them think 
about water management. Later on, all of them validated the representation of water in the 
model (“It is exactly like in reality!”), and some of them suggested some modifications in the 
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calibration of the model. Gradually, the model integrates their perceptions and preoccupations 
and becomes more familiar to them.  
In some other ComMod experiments, the model was built from scratch during  
discussions with local stakeholders (D'Aquino, Le Page et al. 2003). In our case study, a first 
model was built based on the results of interviews, and presented to the local stakeholders and 
confronted to their perceptions through the RPG. One disadvantage of this procedure is that 
some participants might not dare to criticize such a model considered as “scientifically true”. 
In such a case, the continual nature of the process is important as the participants might need 
time to build their self-confidence before to question some of the model features or rules. But 
the advantage of this model building method is that it might facilitate the participation of the 
less powerful stakeholders in the construction of this tool, as it is usually difficult to get their 
opinion during classical group meetings because of their lack of communication skills and 
their public deference towards community leaders or representatives. As a woman said: 
“during the village meetings, they only speak, and I sleep. But in the game, I really think by 
myself.” Consequently, starting the collective process with the gaming sessions has an ice-
breaking effect stimulating an interactive exchange of points of view.  
Models highlight differences among stakeholders 
This method of co-constuction will be all the more efficient to take social inequities into 
account that the RPG and the MAS models initially proposed by the researchers will make the 
existing differences among stakeholders more explicit and highlight their (open or potential) 
conflicts of interests. If the process had started with a classic group discussion, the powerful 
stakeholders with access to water would have said there was no water management problem. 
The first gaming session highlighting the differences among the participants was important 
for the problem of the less powerful to take central stage. It increased the collective awareness 
of the necessity to solve this problem, and triggered the start of exchanges about ways to 
tackle it. Several authors underline that classical participatory approaches often failed to 
tackle power relations because they overlook differences among people and try to reach 
consensus too fast (Wollenberg, Anderson et al. 2001). 
Move on beyond the first apparent consensus 
This experiment demonstrated twice how important it was to move beyond the first apparently 
reached consensus while facilitating the negotiation process (in the discussions about the kind 
of water infrastructures first, and then about the rules of allocation of water). This is because 
it usually reflects the interest of the most powerful players who dominate the discussions. This 
is especially important in Akha and Thai societies because of the respect for the social 
hierarchy. The participants always let the people with the higher social ranks speak first, and 
will not easily dare to contradict them.  
Alternating  individual interviews and group debates 
The point made in the previous paragraph explains why it is important to conduct individual 
interviews beside plenary discussions to give more opportunities to the participants to express 
freely their own opinions about the topics under discussion, including in the absence of the 
most powerful participants. This is illustrated in this experiment by the numerous differences 
between the answers given by some participants during individual inteviews and collective 
discussions. Typically, while in a collective session they would say that they had no water 
because they lacked the money to buy PVC pipes, in a one-on-one interview they would 
declare that it was because of the current implementation of the “first arrived first served” 
rule.  
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Continual and iterative nature of the process 
As most conflicts are not solved in public but behind the scenes (Fisher and Ury 1981), the 
continual and iterative nature of the ComMod process (here the alternance of field and 
laboratory activities within the third cycle) is also a feature favouring the integrative 
accommodation of multiple interests. People continue to discuss between the formal 
participatory sessions, and the ComMod process accompanies the evolution of these 
discussions behind the scenes. In this experiment, if we had stopped the process after the 
single gaming workshop, we would have missed the following change in the agreed-upon 
rules for water allocation which was finally more favourable to the less powerful. Ramirez 
(2001) also points out that collective learning is a continual and iterative process, therefore 
requiring continual and iterative facilitating methods, although that is not easy to practice, 
especially under a time-limited project mode of operation.  
Limits and perspectives for improvement 
All these aspects allowed the usually voiceless people to participate in the elaboration of a 
new project at the village level. However, how far is this going to actually impact the life of 
this community? What persepctives of improvements did this experiment suggest? 
How to involve “those who did not play the game”? 
One main limitation of this ComMod process, also mentioned by the players, is that “those 
who played the game now think differently, in a more collective way, but those who did not 
play the game do not all think the same way”. This limits the potential impact of the ComMod 
process. Most of the players speak about what they have learned during the ComMod process 
to their relatives or neighbours. But as they say, “some of them understand, but some do not. 
They should play the game too.” However, it is difficult to organize gaming sessions with 
more than 15-20 participants, and it would be too costly to multiply the number of such 
gaming sessions. A first solution could be to make a very simple game that the villagers could 
play automously, but this rely on the commitment and training of a local facilitator (a villager 
or a local development worker) and beyond the difficulty to find such a person, it would raise 
a risk of manipulation of the process by this person. Another way could be to call whole 
village meetings after each gaming and simulation workshop to present and discuss its results. 
The challenge would be to find an interactive and accessible way to allow those who did not 
participate to understand as well as if they had themselves participated. It could be interesting 
to find a new way to combine the use of the RPG and MAS models for such a purpose.       
How to better facilitate a bottom-up dialogue with higher institutional levels? 
This ComMod experiment failed to stimulate a genuine bottom-up dialogue between the Mae 
Salaep villagers and their TAO President. In spite of her discourse on participation, she did 
not listen to the villagers when she was given the opportunity to do so. Because these officers 
are usually not yet ready to participate in a truly bottom-up dialogue, there is a need to train a 
new generation of local administrators mastering participatory approaches. In such a context, 
the ComMod approach could be further improved to facilitate such a dialogue across 
institutional levels. Greater efforts should be pursued to raise local officers’ awareness of the 
ComMod process before it starts, which would require to better understand their own interest 
to participate (or not) in the process.  
CONCLUSION 
This experiment illustrates the importance of power relations in participatory water 
management processes and demonstrates that it is not always enough to put stakeholders 
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together around a table to stimulate the emergence of a sustainable and equitable solution to a 
water management conflict. This paper calls for a “critical” Companion Modelling paying 
attention to power relations, in which the initial socio-political system would be carefully 
analyzed to identify the main constraints towards democratic participation, and to adapt the 
ComMod process to mitigate them.  
The main constraints to participatory decentralization based on the Tambon 
Administrative Organization identified along this process are threefolds:  
- the lack of villagers awareness of the possibility to participate in decision-making, and 
their weak ability to do so, in particularly for the less powerful ones,    
- the lack of downward accountability of the more powerful village representatives who 
do not easily take the diversity of interests in the community into account, 
- the lack of truly bottom-up dialogue with TAO administrators.  
The ComMod process succeeded in mitigating the first two constraints to a certain 
extent. The less powerful villagers were empowered through improved self-confidence and 
capacities, and through the creation of alliances leading to more accountability from the TAO 
village representative towards them at the end of the process. We identified some important 
methodological features which helped to level the playing field. Some of them are 
characteristic of the ComMod approach, such as the co-construction and use of tools that are 
within the reach of everyone, the use of models highlighting differences among people, a 
continual and iterative process to accompany the evolution of exchanges taking place behind 
the scene. We also highighted the importance of other aspects which are not specific to the 
ComMod approach, but which were specific to the “critical” ComMod process which was 
implemented in this case study, like the careful selection of participants, the need to move 
beyond the first apparent consensus, and to let people express themselves during individual 
interviews beside group debates.  
The role and management of power relations in a ComMod process is currently being  
debated among ComMod practicionners. Is it necessary to carry out a preliminary in-depth 
analysis of power relations? Is it possible to modify them along the process for the benefit of 
the majority? Is it legitimate for researchers to be involved in such processes? Should (and 
could) a facilitator be neutral? Should the facilitator find systematically a way to empower the 
more voiceless participants? In a word, should ComMod adopt a critical vision? As Faysse 
(2006) said, this probably mainly depends on the context. The more extensive the social 
inequities are, the more power relations will influence the process, and the more it will be 
necessary to analyze them and take them into account in a negotiation support process such as 
ComMod.    
To some extent, this “critical” ComMod process succeeded in tackling two identified 
constraints to participatory decentralization at the community level, but the third one remains 
a challenge for the future: how to favour a genuine bottom-up dialogue with higher 
institutional levels? Are participatory processes like ComMod able and sufficient to create 
and reinforce such kind of dialogue? Or is it, like Argiros (2001) said, a deeper problem due 
to the hierarchical and non-participatory institutional culture of Thailand’s highly centralized 
bureaucracy?  If Thailand really wants to implement decentralization and practice public 
participation, the training of a new generation of local administrators to master participatory 
approaches is seen as a priority. To support this, the positive outcomes of a few pilot 
participatory gaming and simulation experiments for democratic decentralization could serve 
as inspiring examples.  
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